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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the use and consequences of shared compensation plans (profit sharing, profit 
related pay, SAYE schemes and company stock option plans) in a sample of UK workplaces and firms 
in the 1990s.  The use of these plans has increased over time, in part in response to government 
programs.  The evidence shows that companies and workplaces adopting shared compensation 
practices have had higher productivity than other firms, but the effects vary among programs, suggesting 
that the particulars matter a lot in aligning shared compensation and work place activities.  Consistent 
with incentive theory, the evidence also shows that firms and workplaces with shared compensation 
practices have a higher incidence of shared decision-making/information sharing practices.  
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“Share ownership offers employees a real stake in their company ... I want, through targeted reform, to reward long 
term commitment by employees.  I want to encourage the new enterprise culture of team work in which everyone 
contributes and everyone benefits from success.” 
 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Gordon Brown HM Treasury, 1999 
 
 
Background and Motivation 
 
Many analysts and decision-makers in industry, labor, and government believe that the traditional wage-
employment relationship is not appropriate for a modern competitive economy.  In place of the historic 
capital/labor dichotomy, where employers pay a fixed wage for the right to tell employees what to do, a 
new system has developed, of work arrangements where employees share in the financial fortunes of the 
firm and make many of the decisions that determine firm performance.  This shared capitalist model of 
work and compensation (Freeman, 1999) dominates new information-technology firms in the US, but it 
is found in other sectors and countries, as well.  
For over two decades, the United Kingdom has tried to encourage shared capitalist practices 
by offering tax advantages to firms that link pay to profits or that provide company shares to workers or 
that encourage workers to save through stock options, or that develop approved share option plans.  In 
1999 the UK government issued draft legislation introducing two new plans:  an All Employee Share 
Plan through which employees will be able to buy “Partnership” shares in their firm out of pre-tax and 
pre National Insurance Contribution salary; and Enterprise Management Incentives intended to help 
smaller companies with potential for growth recruit and retain high caliber employees, by giving tax 
advantages to options granted to a small number of employees1  By contrast, the government has moved 
to eliminate tax advantages for profit-related pay, on the notion that many firms used this to get tax-
advantages without really linking pay to profits.  The 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
shows that 86% of the establishments that had profit-related pay were taking advantage of the tax 
break. 
                                                                 
1 The government planned to introduce new legislation in 2001.  See 
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pbr2000/ir2.htm 
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Behind the desire to increase shared compensation in the UK is the widespread belief, 
expressed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that shared capitalist arrangements will create a better 
work culture, with improved productivity and commitment by employees.  Existing studies on profit-
sharing, employee ownership, and employee participation lends general support to this proposition 
(Kruse, Kruse and Weitzman, OECD, 1995; Doucouliagos, 1995), but these studies also show 
considerable variability in the effects of practices on firm performance.  In addition, the economic 
context in which the programs operate (e.g. whether information sharing takes place or not) and the 
details of the schemes seem to affect their success rate.  
Our goals address the following two questions.  How far has UK moved from standard wage-
employment contracts towards a shared mode of compensation?  What effect has shared compensation 
had on economic outcomes? 
This paper examines these questions using a 1999 survey of the shared compensation strategies 
used by a sample of UK listed companies between 1995 and 1998, and the 1998 Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey (WERS) of some 2000 UK establishments or workplaces, and the 
1990-1998 longitudinal WERS panel survey of nearly 900 workplaces.  We use these data to describe 
the growth and use of shared capitalist compensation practices and to assess the effects of these 
practices on productivity and related economic outcomes.  We have three findings: 
1.  Shared compensation practices are substantial and growing in the UK, in large part in 
response to Treasury policies designed to encourage them.  Upwards of half of UK workplaces have 
some form of shared compensation programme and over a third had something beyond profit-related 
pay (which the government abolished as of 2000).  Some half of listed firms in our firm-based data also 
had some form of shared compensation. 
2.  Firms and establishments with shared compensation, particularly those with deferred profit-
sharing and employee share ownership, are more likely to establish formal communication and 
consultation channels with workers than other establishments. 
3.  Firms and establishments that use shared compensation tend to outperform other firms and 
establishments in productivity and financial performance.  Moreover, the stock price of firms with shared 
compensation practices has also performed better than those of other firms.  But combining shared 
compensation and information/communication systems does not add extra productivity impact. 
Overall, our findings are quite similar across firm and establishment data sets in telling a 
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favourable story about shared compensation modes of pay, including the share ownership schemes that 
have become a UK government priority.  The one area where our two data sources tell a different story 
is with profit-related pay; our firm analysis finds that profit-related pay has no effect on productivity 
while our establishment data finds an effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 deals with shared compensation 
policies and practices in the UK.  Section 2 asks how should shared compensation arrangements affect 
firm performance.  Sections 3 and 4 provide the main evidence.  Section 3 deals with the firm level 
evidence using the company survey, and Section 4 uses the WERS data.  Finally, in Section 5 we offer 
some concluding remarks. 
 
 
1.  Shared Compensation Policies and Practices in the UK 
 
As noted, the UK has experimented with a rich variety of policies to encourage shared compensation.  
Exhibit 1 provides a capsule summary of policies from the late 1970s to 2000 divided between schemes 
designed for all employees and schemes designed for top management and other special workers.  
The most widely used system was profit-related pay, which gave income tax relief to workers 
for compensation related to profits.  Profit-related pay schemes were widely adopted after the 1987 
introduction of the tax break so that by 1998 32% of British workplaces and 37% of workers were 
receiving part of their pay for profit-related reasons.  However, the Treasury came to view the system as 
overly open to scam behaviour with firms finding ways to classify any sort of pay as “profit-related” to 
take advantage of the tax break.  It began phasing the program out in 1997.  As of 2000, profit-related 
pay was history in the UK.   
The UK government has programmes that encourage firms to pay workers in shares or stock 
options or that encourage employees to invest in shares.  One important UK plan is the Save as You 
Earn (SAYE) share option scheme, which gives tax relief to workers who enter a savings contract that 
puts money into an account to buy the shares when the period ends.  The 1978 Finance Act introduced 
approved profit-sharing schemes as a vehicle for companies to provide free shares to employees that 
carry no tax liabilities.  This plan is being phased out and replaced by the All Employee Share Plan, 
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which allows firms to give free shares to workers without tax liability and also gives tax breaks to 
employees who buy shares that they hold for 5 years (with smaller tax breaks to workers who hold 
them for 3 years).  
In addition to these schemes, the UK gives tax advantages to shared compensation plans that go 
largely to top management.  Company Share Option Plans allow employees to purchase shares at a 
pre-determined price at some future date, without paying income tax on the grant or on any increase in 
the market value of shares.  In 2000 the government introduced an Enterprise Market Incentive 
option program to help smaller companies with potential for growth to recruit and retain high caliber 
employees. 
 
Data on shared compensation in UK 
 
Our information on shared compensation practices in the UK comes from two bodies of data:  the 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS) and a special survey of listed firms that Martin 
Conyon and Laura Read conducted in 1999.  From the WERS, we use the 1998 cross section survey, 
which contains information on compensation and employment practices at 2191 workplaces in Britain 
with 10 or more employees; and the 1990-1998 WERS panel survey, which contains information on 
882 surviving workplaces from the 1990 survey.  The WERS surveys have extremely high response 
rates – 80% for the 1998 cross-section and 86% for the 1990-98 longitudinal survey2 that make it 
particularly valuable for obtaining an accurate picture of shared compensation practices at British work 
places.  But the WERS is not perfect for our analysis.  It has only categorical measures of establishment 
outcomes (whether productivity and financial performance are a lot or somewhat above or below 
average in a sector) and little information about the company as a whole.  To obtain better data on firm-
level compensation strategy and performance, we rely on the Conyon-Read 1999 survey of UK firms 
listed on the London Stock Exchange.3  This survey contains 299 completed usable responses from a 
                                                                 
2 Interviews were conducted with a manager in each workplace, and 950 worker representatives were also interviewed, 
representing 82% of cases where an eligible representative was identified. Completed questionnaires were obtained 
from 28,323 employees, around two-thirds of those distributed. 
 
3 Investment trusts were excluded from the sampling frame.  Effectively a potential population of 1505 companies was 
identified on 11 April 1999.  The survey questionnaire was sent to the human resource director or company secretary 
at each firm.  Where possible the individual HR director was identified by name and addressed to him or her.  We 
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sample of 1518, giving a response rate of 20%, which is good for surveys of this type.  The sample is 
generally  representative of the sampled population.4  Because these are listed companies, we can 
measure actual value added and related variables and track share prices, which we cannot do with the 
WERS data.  By combining information from the two sources, we provide more robust results about the 
effects of shared compensation than would otherwise be the case. 
Exhibit 2 contains statistics on shared compensation practices in 1998 from the WERS and   
WERS panel surveys.  The upper panel gives the percentage of firms with the specified compensation 
practice in 1998, weighted by the sample weights.5  It shows that the most popular form of shared 
compensation was profit-related pay or bonuses, the vast majority of which were part of the approved 
Inland Revenue scheme.  The second most important form of shared compensation was “other cash 
bonus”schemes.  This was followed by employee share ownership schemes, covering 14.6% of 
workplaces and 22% of employees.  Deferred profit-sharing schemes were the least frequently used 
form of shared compensation.  The second panel of Exhibit 2 gives figures for non-managerial workers. 
 For the plans on which we have data for all workers and non-managerial workers, the percentages 
covered are modestly lower for the latter, indicating that the bulk of these plans are offered to the 
majority of the work force.  In fact, questions in the WERS on the proportion of non-managerial 
workers covered show a bi-modal distribution, with most firms offering plans to 90% to 100% of the 
work force or to no one.  Finally, 11.5% of establishments and 17.3% of workers have some form of 
group performance related pay.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
administered the survey as follows.  There were three waves to the survey.  The first was a fax survey, the second a 
postal survey and the third another fax survey.  The number of firms completing the survey in each wave was 157, 80 
and 62 respectively.  In addition another 52 companies in total responded but declined to take part in the survey.  The 
reasons for not completing the survey included (i) company policy not to complete surveys (ii) do not hold relevant 
statistics (iii) too busy (iv) not applicable to that company 
 
4 The procedure involved estimating a standard probit model where the outcome variable was equal to one if the 
company was in the sample and zero otherwise.  The right hand side variables were log market value, log of 
employment, log of capital and 10 sector dummies.  The null hypothesis of no differences between the sample and 
non-sample firms in terms of these characteristics was tested.  This would be confirmed by non-significant 
coefficients on each of the right hand side variables.In the event, it was found that companies with a high market 
value were about 4% more likely to respond and companies with more employees were about 4% less likely to 
respond.  Other control variables (capital intensity variable and sector dummies) were not significant. 
 
5 Weighting by the establishment weights is very important to obtain nation-wide representative figures because of 
the WERS sampling design.  Unweighted figures show much higher proportions with shared capitalist forms of pay, 
because the sample has disproportionately many large firms with such practices. 
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The third panel in the exhibit shows the pattern of shared compensation in the longitudinal 
WERS file in 1998.  The questions on shared compensation in the longitudinal file relate specifically to 
the legal schemes and thus give a more precise link to the policies in Exhibit 1.  We report the figures 
here without taking account of the sample weights because our ensuing analysis focuses on each 
establishment as an independent observation, and the weights have less meaning given what ultimately 
turns out to be a relatively small sample of establishments that change their shared compensation 
strategy.  These data show that about 40% of establishments were covered by profit-related pay, about 
30% covered by SAYE share options, 21% by discretionary or executive option schemes, and about 
8% by deferred profit-sharing or other share ownership schemes. 
Turning to our firm based survey, Exhibit 3 gives the prevalence of practices across the sample 
of listed firms for all employees, and for managerial and non-managerial employees taken separately 
from 1995 to 1998.  Consistent with the establishment results, the data shows that firms in the sample 
increased their use of Inland Revenue approved compensation practices over this period.  For instance, 
the 31.1% of firms report that use of SAYE schemes in 1995 increased to 45.8% in 1998; the 18.8% 
who used the (now defunct) approved profit related pay schemes in 1995 increased to 25.1% in 1998; 
and so on.  But the data also show increases in the use of non-approved schemes.  The proportion of 
firms with discretionary option schemes, which are directed at selected employees such as directors 
doubled over the period from 22.9% in 1995 to 42.8% in 1998.  UK firms rarely use company wide 
bonus schemes related to improvements in productivity.  Finally, conditional on having a particular 
scheme, the data also show that companies are more likely to use shared compensation practices for 
managerial employees than for non-managerial employees, with one exception: the approved profit 
related pay schemes (which are phased out as of the year 2000). 
 
 
2.  How Should Shared Compensation Affect Firm Performance? 
 
Agency considerations  
 
In principle, shared compensation should motivate workers to work harder and make decisions 
favorable to the firm, thereby improving corporate performance and ultimately the present discounted 
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value of the enterprise.  Shared compensation helps resolve the moral hazard problem between the 
owner of the firm and the employee when effort levels of the employee are not perfectly observed or 
verified.  An optimal second best shared compensation contract motivates the employee to focus upon 
what the owner cares about while recognizing the trade-off between risk and incentives.  
Agency theory predicts that the extent of shared compensation will depend on the 
characteristics of employees and the firm.  The less risk averse the employee, the higher is the optimal 
sharing rate between the owner and the employee because the employee is more willing to bear the 
relevant risk.  Similarly, the less effort averse the employee, the higher is the optimal sharing rate, since 
that employee will be more willing to put out the requisite effort.  On the firm’s side, the greater the likely 
impact of effort on profits, the bigger is the incentive to link employee income to performance.  In 
addition, the more accurate the firm’s signal of employee effort and activity the higher is the optimal 
sharing rate.  The firm should share more rewards when it is more certain that output results come from 
employee activity, rather than from some exogenous factor.  At the same time, the firm should not be 
able to monitor perfectly the effort/activity of the worker, for if management could do that, it would not 
need an incentive contract in the first place to induce appropriate employee actions. 
This analysis has several implications for understanding shared capitalist arrangements.  First, in 
general we would expect, in the absence of free-rider problems (see below), that shared compensation 
systems are associated with improved performance.  However, the analysis also suggests that firms with 
shared compensation practices are likely to draw on workers with different characteristics than those 
that choose other firms – workers with less risk aversion and less disutility from work – and will also 
have themselves different characteristics than other firms.  This creates a problem in inferring causal 
relations from regressions based on cross-section comparisons.  Our response is to rely largely on fixed 
effects models that contrast a firm before/after introduction of shared compensation practices.  This is 
not perfect, since the introduction of new shared arrangements is itself endogenous, but it does give an 
accurate picture of performance of the same firm or workplace under different conditions.  
 
Decentralisation of decision-making rights 
 
Second, the analysis suggests that shared compensation should be accompanied by shared decision-
making.  The process of transforming inputs into outputs in capitalist firms increasingly relies on the 
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performance of multiple tasks by employees.  These tasks are bundled into jobs that vary by the number 
of tasks performed by the employee as well as the decision-making authority assigned to the worker.  
The trend in the 1990s has been towards jobs that have a wider variety of tasks and that allow 
employees to make more decisions.  The benefits to the firm of decentralizing decision making authority 
will depend on such factors as: worker specific (localized) knowledge in the performance of the tasks; 
the conservation of management time; and more effective motivation of workers.  It pays the firm to give 
incentives to workers only when workers have discretion to vary what they do at workplaces, and it 
pays management to devolve decisions to employees only when employees have incentives to make 
decisions that raise the value of the firm.  We examine this linkage in our empirical work. 
Third, there are potentially important costs to decentralizing decision-making rights.  These 
include agency costs, co-ordination costs, and the inefficient use of central information by local decision-
makers.  There are also important questions about the potential efficiency effects of all-employee-stock-
option plans and other schemes that link worker pay to measures of aggregate company performance 
rather than to group or workplace performance.  Chief executive officers (CEOs) and other top 
executives can affect share prices, so that options or share ownership can help resolve the principal-
agent problem for them (see Conyon and Murphy, 2000).  But employees lower in the firms’ hierarchy 
have little direct effect on the company stock price.  They lack a clear “line of sight” linking their 
decisions to the share prices/company profit levels that would affect their pay.  As a result, we would 
expect firms to use more narrowly defined performance targets – establishment, group, or workplace-
related incentive pay systems – for these workers, and that those forms of shared compensation would 
be more effective in motivating workers than programs that link pay to more aggregate measures. 
Core and Guay (1999) using US data show that the provision options to all employees are 
consistent with incentive theory.  Firms with more monitoring costs, greater growth opportunities and 
whose employees have greater marginal products allocate greater amounts of option incentives to all 
employees. 
 
The free rider problem 
 
The classic problem with any group performance related pay scheme is the free-rider problem (also 
known as the “1/N problem”, where N is the total number of employees in the team or group).  In most 
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work situations, employees perform tasks that involve productive interactions with colleagues where 
total output reflects the contribution of many individuals.  Team production suggests that individual 
contribution to output cannot be easily identified and compensation must be based on some aggregate 
measure of output such as team or division output.  But in such settings, there is a potentially weak 
connection between individual effort and reward.   If rewards are shared equally on the basis of team 
production (and rewards cannot exceed the revenues of the group), then each individual has the 
incentive to shirk because they will gain only 1/N of the combined gains from increased effort (Kruse, 
1993; Blasi et al, 1996; Kandel and Lazear, 1992).  Each employee hopes that his or her colleague will 
put forth the greater effort to increase output than doing it themselves, benefiting from increased 
productivity without bearing the costs. 
A number of potential solutions have been suggested to overcome the free-rider problem.  One 
solution is for workers to self-monitor or act as de-facto monitors themselves.  Another is for firms to 
invest in policies that promote team culture and employee participation where group incentives provide a 
substitute for monitoring through peer pressure.  This horizontal monitoring may help resolve the free 
rider problem (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Lazear, 1995).  It is possible that firms that use all-employee 
stock options or other ownership schemes do so to help create a culture of teamwork and co-operative 
company spirit that over-rides the free rider problem.  
 
Extant evidence for the UK 
 
There is considerable evidence on the relationship between employee ownership or profit sharing and 
corporate performance, but less on the relationship between all employee stock options and 
performance or of individual ownership of shares, which UK legislation favours, and performance.  The 
majority of the studies are of US origin, but there have been some notable British studies and important 
studies in other countries as well.  The first important analysis was the US General Accounting Office 
study in 1987, which found that Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) had an inconclusive impact 
on outcomes.  Since then research findings have been more positive, so that a general summary is 
moderately favorable to shared compensation.  The strongest results are for profit-sharing (Kruse, 
1993; Doucouliagos, 1995) while those for employee ownership are more problematic.  Kruse and 
Blasi (1995) report on ten studies of US ESOPs that have compared ‘before and after’ implementation 
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productivity effects using large databases.  The majority yield positive but often-insignificant estimated 
effects of ESOP adoption on output. 
We briefly summarize extant UK studies.  In the 1980s, analysts looked at the impact of profit 
sharing and employee ownership through co-operatives on firm performance.  Using the Workplace 
Industrial Relations (WIRS) that is the predecessor to the WERS survey, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1988) found no relationship between financial performance or the quality of industrial relations and 
measures of shared compensation:  the existence of share ownership, a stock option plan, profit sharing, 
or bonus scheme.  In a sample of about 100 UK companies between 1974 and 1982 Wadhwani and 
Wall (1990) found weak evidence that profit-sharing boosted productivity.   Cable and Wilson (1989) 
found a positive significant productivity effect for profit sharing in a sample of 52 British engineering 
firms; that quality circles, briefing groups or job rotation also had a positive effect on productivity too; 
and that having both profit sharing and employee involvement added most to productivity.  
Studies in the 1990s have added to the general picture of modest positive effect of shared 
compensation on outcomes.  Estrin et al (1997) report a productivity improvement of about 6% in cases 
where profit sharing bonuses were of the order 5% - 10% of market wages.  Robinson (1998) found 
that the Save as You Earn Schemes (SAYE) was associated with a productivity premium of 23% and 
that consultative/representative forms of employee participation also raised productivity.   McNabb and 
Whitfield (1998) used establishment data from WIRS and found that both financial participation and 
profit related pay are positively related to financial performance.  
In short, the extant UK evidence paints a picture much like that in the US studies:  profit-sharing 
has larger effects than ownership on productivity, but neither are overwhelmingly powerful across 
studies. 
 
 
3.  Production Function Evidence:  Firm Level Results 
 
We begin with our firm-based production function analysis.  Appendix A shows the main characteristics 
of the data in our sample, in addition to the shared compensation characteristics shown in Exhibit 3a and 
Exhibit 3b.  We have information on sales, employment, and capital that allows us to estimate 
 11 
 
production functions for 284 companies between 1995 and 1998.  Trade union presence is constant 
across time at around 23%.  Our measure of product market competition, the number of firms reporting 
more than five competitors, increased from 72% of firms in 1995 to 77% in 1999.  Our measure of 
information sharing shows a more marked increase from 43.1% in 1995 to 61% in 1998.  However, 
firms are much less likely to have a joint committee of managers and employees for the purposes of 
consultation. 
To assess the productivity effects of different Inland Revenue approved shared compensation 
systems on firm level performance, we used a Cobb-Douglas production function of the following form: 
Log(Qit) = a i + ß1ln(Lit) + ß2ln(Kit) + ß3(Unionit) + ß4(Competitionit) + 
 ß5(Share Compensationkit) +ßt (Year Dummies) + eit 
where Q is real sales (Datastream item 104),  
L is total employment (Datastream item 219),  
K is an estimate of the current real capital stock (based on a accrual method);  
Union is a time varying measure of trade union presence (available from the survey data);  
Competition is product market competition measure (a dummy variable = 1 if more than 5 
competitors, available from the survey data)  
The key explanatory variables are the measures of shared compensation.  They are dummy 
variables for (i) approved profit-sharing scheme (ii) approved profit related pay scheme (iii) approved 
all employee share scheme (iv) approved company share option scheme.   
The terms ai are the company fixed effects.  By including them we eliminate time invariant firm 
factors such as short-run managerial ability, risk etc.  But a fixed effects model does not resolve all 
problems with non-experimental data.  There remain issues about endogeneity and dynamics.  The 
endogeneity issue is straightforward.  Employees in highly profitable firms may demand some form of 
their pay in the form of shared compensation.  However, in the absence of suitable instruments (as in 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1988, page 724) we estimated a single equation with fixed effects.  The key 
dynamic issue relates to the timing of the shared compensation practices.  Ideally, we would have lagged 
the compensation practice variables to see whether the introduction of a scheme was subsequently 
associated with increased productivity or if costs of adjustment delayed its benefits but the short time 
series precluded this strategy. 
Exhibits 4 contain our principal results on the relationship between firm level productivity and 
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shared modes of compensation.  Columns (1) to (4) enter each of the schemes separately into the 
productivity equation.  Column (5) enters each of the four schemes jointly.  The calculations show a 
significant  positive correlation between firm productivity and two of the Inland Revenue approved 
schemes: profit sharing scheme and the company share option plan.  We find no evidence of a 
relationship between the approved profit related pay scheme (no longer in operation as of 2000) or of 
the approved all employee share option scheme.  The coefficient estimates suggest quite large 
productivity effects.  For instance, from column 5 the point estimate on the approved profit sharing 
scheme (0.173) implies an increase in productivity of 18.9%6.  Similarly, the productivity effect 
associated with the approved company share option plan (coefficient estimate 0.121) is 12.2%7.   
The differential effect of the different shared compensation systems fits with our earlier 
discussion.  Approved company share option schemes cover selected employees, typically directors, 
who can affect company performance in response to stock option incentives.  The impact of profit-
sharing scheme is more difficult to account for: on the one side, it is based on profits, which are more 
susceptible to employee effort than share prices, but the reward are shares, which are more risky than 
would cash or profit-related bonuses.  Since the new all employee partnership share system is a close 
lineal descendent of the approved profit-sharing scheme, the results suggest that the new program will 
have positive effects.  Finally, the negligible coefficient on the profit-related pay scheme (consistent with 
Blanchflower and Oswald) indicates that the decision to terminate this program will have no adverse 
productivity effects (though it will hurt employee owned firms that have used the program, such as John 
Lewis, among others, at least until they find substitute ways to reward staff). 
Further experiments were carried out to test the robustness of our firm level findings.  We 
imposed constant returns to scale on the production function.  The overall results remained unchanged.  
For example, the re-estimated full model contained in Exhibit 4 column 5 yielded labour and capital 
coefficients of respectively 0.789 and 0.211.  The qualitative effects of the shared compensation 
indicator variables remained unaltered.  The approved profit related pay and SAYE dummies were 
insignificant.  The point estimate (robust standard error) on the Approved Profit Sharing scheme was 
                                                                 
6 Calculated as (e0.1733 – 1)´ 100 
 
7 Calculated as (e0.1213 – 1) ´100 
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0.176 (0.075) and for the Approved Company Share Option plan it was 0.106 (0.064).  Both variables 
are significant though the estimate on the company share option plan falls slightly. 
Our firm-based survey also gathered data on whether or not the firm shared information with 
employees, consulted with employees, or communicated with them extensively.  We use these data to 
develop an information sharing dummy variable for firms that had at least one of the schemes and added 
this variable to the equation, and interacted it with the shared compensation variables.8  A positive 
interaction term indicates that a shared compensation system is more effective in environments where 
information, consultation and communication between employees and managers is also found.  The 
results of this analysis, given in Appendix B, indicate that information sharing is not associated with 
higher productivity, conditional on shared compensation, and that the interaction of shared compensation 
and information sharing, communication and consultation between managers and employees does not 
contribute to higher productivity.9 
Finally, (6) and (7) of Exhibit 4 record results of regressions in which we used the percentage of 
employees covered by the scheme, rather than a 0-1 presence of mode of compensation, as the 
independent variable.10   The two columns differentiate the type of employee covered by the shared 
compensation scheme.  Column 6 focuses on managerial employees.  Column 7 treats non-managerial 
employees.  This division is motivated by the notion that company share option schemes ought to have a 
much greater effect among managerial employees, while approved profit-sharing schemes might have a 
more even-handed impact.  The evidence shows a positive though not statistically significant impact of 
share options for managers on production but no effect for non-managers but shows a larger impact of 
approved profit-sharing schemes for non-managerial workers.  The different proportions of managers 
and non-managers covered by the schemes, makes it hard to reach a sharp conclusion, however, since 
the results may be partly driven by those proportions rather than any differences in behaviour. 
 
                                                                 
8 The equation is: Log(Qit) = ai + ß1ln(Lit) + ß2ln(Kit) + ß3(Unionit) + ß4(Competitionit) +ß5(Share Compensationkit) 
+ß6(Info. Sharing) + ß7(Infor sharing ´  Share Compensationkit) +ßt (Year Dummies) + eit 
 
9 Recall that the information sharing variable is made up three other variables.  See Exhibit 3.  These component 
variables were tried separately to see whether this altered the results.  They did not. 
 
10 Where a company does not have a scheme the variable is coded zero. 
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Stock market evidence 
 
A different way to examine the effect of shared compensation on the performance of listed firms is to 
compare the development of the stock price of firms with shared compensation to the stock prices of 
other firms.  If firms with shared compensation make investments that raise sales in the future and thus 
raise the value of the firm, this could show up in the growth of their stock prices, but not in current 
productivity figures.11  Accordingly, we examined the link between stock prices and the extent of shared 
compensation.  A London firm, Capital Strategies, produces an Employee Ownership Index (EOI) of 
the share prices of firms that have a “significant degree of employee share ownership”, which it then 
compares to general movements in the London stock market.  Exhibit 5 shows that the EOI 
outperformed the all share index in the 1990s.  An investment of £100 in the EOI in 1992 would be 
worth £667, while the same investment in the FTSE All-Share Index would be worth £244.12  Using our 
299 listed firm data base we identified companies that used approved profit sharing or all employee 
share schemes and created an index of their share prices from 1991 to 1999.  Exhibit 5 shows that 
£100 invested in the portfolio of companies that use share based compensation plans grew to £350.  
However, the same £100 invested in FTSE All Share index in 1990 is worth about £250 in 1999.  
As neither the Capital Strategies nor our index control for risk factors nor for the concentration 
of these firms in particular sectors, this evidence should be viewed as suggestive only.  The consistency 
with our productivity results, however, lends weight to the overall conclusion that in fact shared 
capitalism pays off for firms.  But to explore this issue further we estimated stock returns equations 
similar to those advocated by Wadwhani and Wall (1990).13  The results of estimating our simple market 
model are contained in Exhibit 5 column 1.  The simple effect of shared compensation on firm stock 
returns is contained in column 2.  In column 2 the aggregate market return effect drops out of the 
estimating equation since there is only one market return per year and this is collinear with the time 
                                                                 
11  In equilibrium, the impact should be on price-earnings ratios, but in a period of increased use of shared 
compensation, such as the 1990s, it would be reflected in the growth of share prices. 
 
12 http://www.esop.co.uk/press/210800.htm 
 
13 The stock return for a company was defined as the annual change in the company return index to the 31 December 
year-end.  The return index was derived from Datastream item RI, and captures capital appreciation and dividends re-
invested on a continuous basis.  The market return was calculated the same way for the FT All Share Index. 
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dummies.  The results show a similar (but not entirely consistent) pattern to our previously established 
results.  The effect of the all employee profit sharing scheme remains positive and significant with a point 
estimate of about 0.09.  This translates into an effect on ex-post company stock returns of about 9.79% 
(from column 2 of the exhibit).  The economic effect, then, is smaller than observed on productivity, but 
nevertheless it is still positive.  In contrast to the productivity equation estimates, though, the effect of the 
company share option plan is not significant whereas the effect of the SAYE scheme is now significantly 
positive.  It seems that during this period, then, companies that had adopted all employee share schemes 
have significantly higher stock returns.  However, we would add some caveats.  First, the efficient 
market hypothesis suggests that all economic information should be reflected immediately in the share 
price upon announcement of the adoption of a shared compensation scheme.  Second, we can only 
observe whether there is a scheme in place in a particular year; we cannot observe the announcement of 
the adoption of the scheme.  Third, the shared compensation system may be proxying firm fixed effects 
rather than the compensation system itself.  Fourth, the system is likely to be at least partially 
endogenous.  Firms with good stock returns are likely to share rewards with employees.  Future 
research should investigate such issues. 
 
Shared compensation and information/decision-making:  firm level effects 
 
An important prediction from the theory of shared compensation is that there should be a 
complementarity between shared compensation practices should and the allocation of decision making 
rights/information sharing with workers.  To get at this issue we used questions from our firm level survey 
that relate to consultation, communication and information sharing.  In particular the survey asked firms 
to indicate whether they had “A joint committee of managers and employees primarily concerned with 
consultation rather than negotiation”, “A formal structure for information sharing with employees 
(e.g. provision of data on financial status, production and labour market position, market strategy)”, and 
finally “A formal structure for communication between all levels of employees and management (e.g. 
quality circles, newsletters and suggestion schemes)”.  In addition, we created an aggregate variable 
which is the presence of any of these form of information/decision14  
                                                                 
14  These questions are based upon and hence similar to the WIRS/WERS questions.  See the establishment level 
results below.  The descriptive statistics for the firm level questions are contained in Appendix A. 
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To see whether these forms of information/decision-making are more likely in firms with shared 
compensation modes of pay, we regressed the dichotomous variables indicating the presence of these 
four forms of information/decision sharing on the presence of the shared compensation schemes in place 
at UK listed firms.  We estimated simple probit models on the pooled data over the whole sample 
period.  In addition to the experimental shared compensation variables, we also included two other 
measures pay practices.  Specifically, firms were asked to indicate the existence of “Team-based 
performance-related pay (related to the achievement of team objectives)” and the existence of 
“Individual performance-related pay (merit pay or bonuses determined by agreed individual 
objectives)”. 
The results contained in Exhibit 6 report the marginal effects from the probit estimation.  They 
show, as expected, a generally positive correlation between information sharing/decision rights and the 
use by firms of shared compensation structures.15  The general pattern of results, therefore, seems to fit 
with the prediction from incentive theory.  Having team based pay, increases the likelihood of firms using 
consultation, information sharing and communications systems.  They are always positively correlated.  
Moreover, the incidence of some shared compensation systems increases the likelihood of firms 
adopting particular information sharing/decision making environments.  For instance, approved profit 
sharing is generally positively related to consultation and communication systems but not information 
sharing.  Approved SAYE schemes increase the likelihood of all forms of information sharing/decision-
making.  However, there is generally no relation between approved company share option plans and 
information sharing (except the negative impact observed for joint consultation committees).  Finally, we 
find little evidence of a relationship between approved profit related pay schemes and decentralized 
decision making.  This is consistent with the notion that many firms used this to get tax-advantages 
without really linking pay to profits.  We re-consider these issues using the establishment level data 
below. 
4.  Production Function Evidence:  Establishment Level Results 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
15 We experimented with other estimation methods.  For instance, a random effects logit model yielded similar 
qualitative results to those presented in the paper. 
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The WERS survey asks managers to rate the performance of their workplace relative to their industry 
on financial performance and workplace labour productivity.16  The rating is on a five point scale, in 
which many more managers rate their establishment as better than average than below average.  We 
analyze these data using an ordered probit analysis, with the outcomes ordered so that positive 
coefficients imply better outcomes.  Our cross-section analysis links financial performance and 
productivity of each establishment to measures of shared compensation conditional on the number of 
employees, age of establishment, one digit industry, distribution of the work force by skill and gender, 
and with dummy variables for the degree of competition in the sector.  
Exhibit 7a presents the results for the 1998 WERS cross-section.  In these calculations we use 
two different measures of shared compensation as independent variables: a 0/1 absence/presence 
measure of particular types of shared compensation and, in separate calculations, a continuous measure 
of the percentage of non-executive workers covered by the schemes.  We examine the effects of each 
program and also examine the effect of a simple aggregate measure of all the programs that an 
establishment has.  Regardless of the particular measure, the results show a positive relationship 
between shared compensation and economic performance. 
Consider first the results for financial performance.  The calculations for the separate programs 
show that each of the measures of shared compensation are positively related to the financial 
performance of the firm.  The largest and most significant coefficients are for employee share ownership 
and profit-related pay; the smallest and least significant is for deferred profit share.  We are dubious 
about the interpretation of the profit-related pay variable, since firms that have profits are more likely to 
use profit-related pay, but there is no comparable reverse causality  problem in the linkage between 
other shared compensation schemes and performance.   Under the heading summary we report  results 
when we aggregate the four shared compensation systems into a single “summated rating” 
(Bartholomew, 1996).  The summated rating simply adds together the 0/1 variables to obtain an index 
from 0 to 4 depending upon how many forms of shared compensation the firm used.  In the calculation 
the coefficient is positive and over four times its standard error, indicating that, broadly speaking, 
establishments with shared compensation have better performance.  The next columns repeat these 
                                                                 
16  We have also examined the effect of shared compensation on two other variables: quality of goods or services, 
and changes in productivity over the previous five years, and found weaker positive effects for the impact of shared 
compensation on quality and stronger effects for its impact on changes in productivity than the effects shown in the 
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calculations with the proportion of workers covered by each system (or the summation thereof) as the 
independent variables.  They give modestly stronger results to those with the presence of program 
measures.  
The calculations for labour productivity show that employee share ownership and profit- related 
pay are significantly positively linked to productivity, while deferred profit-sharing schemes and group 
performance related pay are not.  Again, the summated rating measure of programs yields a positive 
highly significant coefficient.  In the last two columns, where we use the proportion of non-managerial 
workers covered by the schemes as the independent variables, we obtain comparable results, with 
employee share ownership and profit-related pay most strongly related to productivity among the 
individual programs.  The summated rating statistic has the same strong impact on labour productivity as 
it did on financial performance. 
In addition to the shared compensation variables we included two other human resource related 
measures: whether the firm has some form of individual performance related pay and no group 
performance pay (i.e. piece rates or commissions) and union recognition.  The individual pay measures 
are weakly positively related to financial performance and productivity, while unionism is negatively 
related to financial performance and obtains an insignificant negative coefficient in the productivity 
equation.17 
Finally, Exhibit 7b considers two other outcome measures: the quality of product and services 
and changes in labour productivity.  The relationship between the experimental shared compensation 
variables and changes in labour productivity are qualitatively similar to those established so far.  Namely, 
a positive relationship between shared compensation and economic performance (in this case 
productivity growth).  On the other hand we are unable to identify a relationship between shared 
compensation system and the quality of products and service produced. 
 
Shared compensation and information/decision-making: establishment effects 
 
As noted, a key prediction of the theory of shared compensation is that establishments with shared 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
exhibit. 
17 Metcalf finds that this effect occurs exclusively in establishments where competition is low, suggesting that 
unions are redistributing rents. 
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compensation practices should also share information/decision-making with workers.  The WERS98 
contains a module on consultation and communication that allows us to examine this prediction at the 
establishment level.  Specifically, the WERS asks managers whether their workplace has “a system of 
briefings for any section or sections of the workforce”; “committees of managers and employees ... 
primarily concerned with consultation, rather than negotiation”; “groups at this workplace that solve 
specific problems or discuss aspects of performance or quality ... sometimes known as quality circles”; 
and “consultative committees of managers and employees in your organization that operates at a higher 
level than this establishment.” 
To see whether these forms of information/decision-making are more likely in firms with shared 
compensation modes of pay, we regressed 0/1 variables for presence of these four forms of 
information/decision sharing on the absence or presence of the shared compensation schemes for non-
managerial workers at the establishment.  For simplicity, we used a linear probability regression format 
for these computations.  The results in Exhibit 8 show the expected complementarity, with share 
ownership and (the relatively rare) deferred profit-sharing having the most substantial link to the various 
forms of communication/consultation; and once again, profit-related pay showing the weakest link to the 
various communication/consultation groups – indeed, it is negatively related to joint consultation 
committees and substantially related to higher level committees.  The pattern fits broadly, moreover, with 
what we might reasonably expect from incentive theory.  Group related pay is linked to briefings, 
consultation committees, and quality circles, but not to higher level committees, while employee 
ownership and deferred profit-sharing are relatively strongly related to higher level committees, as well 
as to the lower-level forms of communication and consultation.  But the strongest single variable that 
increases the probability of communication and consultation is the recognition of a union at the 
workplace (see Gregg and Machin, 1988). 
In addition, following the same procedures that we used for analyzing our firm-based data set, 
we examined whether the existence of consultation and communication channels affected the link 
between shared compensation and outcomes and found no evidence that it did nor that the presence of 
both shared compensation and more communication raised productivity more than did the separate 
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impact of each.18 
 
Longitudinal analyses 
 
The cross relation patterns in the WERS in Exhibits 7 and 8 are consistent with the notion that shared 
compensation systems have beneficial economic effects and are associated with greater communication 
and consultation with employees.  But they leave the door open to alternative interpretations of the 
positive relationships.  One interpretation is that the data reflect unobserved differences among firms:  
“good firms” use shared compensation systems, consult or communicate more with employees, and 
have higher productivity.  To examine the unobservable good firm effect we use a fixed effects 
longitudinal analysis that compares the same firm before and after a given change in shared 
compensation modes of pay.  As noted earlier, fixed effects models do not resolve all questions about 
causality in non-experimental data – in particular there are issues relating to the endogeneity of policy – 
but do take us one step closer to the ideal experimental design, particularly if changes in policies reflect 
factors that are themselves uncorrelated with ensuing performance. 
The WERS files permit two types of before/after comparisons.  First, the WERS 1998 “change 
in the workplace” module asked managers about changes in the past five years (1993-1998) in the 
establishment’s labour practices and economic outcomes, including what is critical to us, whether the 
firm increased or decreased  (by a lot or a little) the proportion of non-manual workers covered by 
variable pay, or kept the proportion constant.  By relating changes in the proportion of workers covered 
by variable pay to changes in other key economic measures, such as information provided workers; 
employee decision-making, and productivity, we have a fixed effects analysis, albeit based on questions 
of a retrospective nature.   
Exhibit 9 shows the link between the change in variable pay, given in the rows, and changes in 
other variables, given in the columns.  The first panel shows that firms that increased the proportion of 
workers receiving variable pay also increased information flows to employees while firms that decreased 
variable pay disproportionately reduced the information provided.  The second panel shows that 
                                                                 
18 We entered the consultation/communication variables into the ordered probit calculations in Exhibit 6 and found 
they did not affect the results substantively nor did various forms of interaction between composites of the variables 
and shared compensation variables. 
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changes in variable pay and changes in employee influence over their job also moved in the same 
direction; while the third and fourth panels show the relation for employee influence over managerial 
decision-making, and “how hard people work”.  That in all of these cases changes in variable pay are 
positively related to changes in employee involvement in the work place is impressive and supportive of 
the incentive-based model of shared compensation systems that we sketched out above. 
But what about our bottom line measure of the effect of shared compensation - labour 
productivity?  The last panel records the link between changes in variable pay and changes in labour 
productivity.  This can be viewed as a longitudinal test of the cross section productivity calculations in 
Exhibit 7a.  The results are striking.  62% of managers in firms that increased variable pay a lot reported 
that productivity went up a lot, compared to much lower proportions of managers in firms where 
variable pay increased only a little, didn’t change or went down.  At the other end of the spectrum 
proportionately fewer managers in firms that increased variable pay a lot reported worsened 
productivity performance than did managers in firms with other changes in the proportion of workers 
covered by variable pay.  
 
WERS 1990-1998 Panel  
 
The WERS panel data identifies establishments that hanged their system of shared compensation 
between 1990 and 1998.  Some establishments in the panel survey added non-executive stock 
ownership plans or profit-sharing plans while a small number  withdrew such plans.  If these forms of 
shared compensation in fact contribute to financial performance or labour productivity, we would expect 
to see that proportionately more managers in establishments adopting plans would see an improvement 
in outcomes than in other establishments and that the converse would hold for managers in 
establishments discarding such plans.  However, given that establishments that changed their policies in 
any direction presumably did so in the expectation of improving outcomes, the endogeneity of the choice 
to change plans presumably operates against our finding such an effect.  Exhibit 10 compares the results 
for establishments that changed their profit-sharing or non-executive ownership schemes between the 
1990 and 1998 WERS surveys.  It records the number that changed their programs according to their 
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financial performance or labour productivity in the two years.  The number of firms covered is smaller 
than the number of changes given in the 1998 WERS panel because we deleted observations for 
establishments that did not respond to the 1990 survey question about profit-sharing or ownership even 
though the 1998 WERS panel reported a change from 1990.  We were not sure this was an accurate 
change.   
As a crude summary of the direction of change in productivity and financial performance, we 
have coded the responses to these questions according to a simple numeric scheme.  We give a 0 to 
establishments that reported doing about average; 1 to those that did somewhat above average; 2 to  
those that did a lot above average; and -1 and -2 for the corresponding groups that did somewhat and a 
lot below average.  We then calculated the score for each group.  For instance, the number .57 in the 
1990 column under profit-sharing “added” means that the 86 establishments who added a profit-sharing 
system had a financial performance that was modestly above average in 1990.  Because managers tend 
to over-report their performance, this performance is in fact about average.  The number .79 in the 
1997 column shows that establishments who added profit sharing had that score for their financial 
performance in 1997.  The change from 1990 to 1997 was .22, so establishments that added a profit 
sharing scheme improved their financial performance by that amount on our scale.  Similarly, we 
calculated the change in performance for the 23 establishments that removed a profit sharing scheme in 
the period.  This is .05.  The difference in difference calculation for the establishments is obtained by 
comparing the change in the summary statistic for establishments that added a program and the change 
in the summary statistic for establishments that removed the program.  Positive differences in differences 
imply that the shared compensation system improved an outcome while negative differences imply that it 
made matters worse.  In our case, this is .17, which means that firms who added profit sharing improved 
their performance relative to firms that reduced profit-sharing. 
The results in Exhibit 10 show that in three of the four of the comparisons, the differences in 
differences are positive, implying that with this simple scale, firms that introduced programs had 
improved performance relative to firms that removed programs.  The small samples, however, make this 
at best a suggestive result. 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
The use of shared compensation arrangements by companies increased considerably in the 1990s, with 
the biggest growth occurring among employee ownership schemes.  Our firm level survey indicates that 
companies were much more likely to use Profit Sharing Schemes, Save as You Earn Schemes, and 
Company Share Option Plans (CSOPs) in 1998 compared with 1995.  Our establishment level panel 
data showed an increase in the proportion of establishments with profit sharing and with non-executive 
ownership schemes.   
In part, the growth of shared compensation can be attributed to government policies that 
introduced tax incentives to encourage shared compensation systems in an attempt to enhance corporate 
productivity.  In this respect, the policies of the UK to encourage shared compensation differ noticeably 
from those of the US.  The UK encourages individual ownership while the US encourages collective 
ownership through ESOPs.  The market rather than the state has spurred the growth of options and 
individual share ownership in the US. 
 Shared capitalist modes of pay should improve the economy in two ways.  They should increase 
communication and consultation with workers, which spurs economic democracy.  Our evidence shows 
that shared compensation is indeed linked to various forms of communication and consultation.  They 
also should ideally induce employees to think and act like owners, making decisions that increase 
corporate value.  Our evidence shows that shared compensation systems in the UK are positively 
associated with productivity, though as in other studies, we find that the effect of the systems varies 
across data sets and measures of outcomes. 
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Exhibit 1:  UK Programs to Encourage Shared Capitalism All Employee Schemes 
 
Approved profit related pay 
In 1987 the scheme was introduced for employers to pay a profit related compensation package.  
Initially tax relief was given on half of the profit related payments up to a limit of the lower of £3,000 or 20% 
of the employee’s pay.  The cash limit was increased to £4,000 in 1989.  In 1991 the tax relief was increased 
to the whole of the payment.  In the Finance Act of 1997, the income tax relief was set to be phased out over 
a 3 to 4 year period.  For profit periods beginning in 1998 the cash ceiling was reduced to £2,000 and for 
periods beginning in 1999 the ceiling was reduced to £1000.  As of January 2000, this scheme is now no 
longer running.   
 
Approved profit sharing scheme 
The approved profit sharing scheme is a vehicle for companies to provide free shares to employees 
that are free from tax liabilities.  Profit sharing schemes were introduced in the 1978 Finance Act.  In 2000 
there were about 950 approved profit sharing schemes in operation with an estimated cost to the Government 
in tax relief of £150 million.  Profit sharing schemes must be open to any employee who has been employed 
by the company for more than 5 years.  There are about 1.25 million participants covered under these 
arrangements (source: www.proshare.org).  However, the approved profit sharing scheme is being phased 
out with the introduction of the new all-employee plan.(source: www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk).  
 
New All employee Share Plan (2000).   
Firms can give free shares tax free; employees buy shares out of pre-tax income; firms can match 
employee purchases. Employees who leave firm must withdraw shares.  Firm has flexible performance 
criterion for Tax relief: employees who keep shares for 5 years in “ESOP” trust pay no income tax; pay 
capital gains only on increase in value.  Companies get relief for costs of providing shares for employees. . 
 
Approved Save As You Earn Scheme 
The Save as You Earn (SAYE) scheme, or savings related option scheme, is an arrangement such 
that an employee has the right to buy shares at a future date at a pre-specified purchase price.  The company 
grants employees the option to buy the company’s shares in 3, 5 or 7 years time.  The price is either the 
current market price or the option can be issued at a discount of up to 20% of that price.  The scheme has to 
be open to all employees of the company with more than 5 years’ service (source: 
www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk). There are currently over 1200 such SAYE in operation with an estimated cost to 
the Government in tax relief of £600 million.  There are about 1.75 million participants covered under these 
arrangements (source: www.proshare.org).   
 
 Management/special employee schemes 
 
Approved Company Share Option Plan 
The approved company share option plan (CSOP) is a scheme under which an employee has the right 
to purchase a fixed number of shares at a pre-determined price at some date in the future.  Under this scheme 
options may not be offered at a discount.  The employee does not pay income tax on the grant of the option 
or any increase in the market value of shares before the option is exercised.  Unlike SAYE schemes discretion 
is given to the company as to which employees are eligible and are granted options.  They tend to be granted 
to company directors.  There are currently over 3,750 such approved CSOPs in operation with an estimated 
cost to the Government in tax relief of £130 million.  There are about 450,000 participants covered under 
these arrangements (source: www.proshare.org). 
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Exhibit 2:  Percentages of Employees with Shared Compensation in British 
Establishments, 1998 
 
 
i.  Any employees eligible for variable pay scheme (WERS 1998, weighted) 
 
Establishment  
N % 
Employees  
Sum % 
  
Profit-related payments or bonuses 31.8% 37.4% 
Deferred profit sharing schemes 5.8% 6.4% 
Employee share ownership schemes  14.6% 22.0% 
Other Cash Bonus Schemes 21.2% 24.7% 
Any Variable Pay Scheme  53.0% 63.8% 
  
 
 
ii.  Non-managerial employees eligible for variable pay scheme (WERS 1998, weighted) 
 
 
Establishment  
N % 
Employees  
Sum % 
  
Profit-related payments or bonuses 27.9% 34.5% 
Employee share ownership schemes  12.9% 20.4% 
Any Group Performance Related Schemes  11.5% 17.3% 
  
 
iii.  All employees (WERS Panel, 1990-1998, unweighted) 
 
 
Establishment  
N % 
Employees  
Sum % 
  
Profit-related payments or bonuses 41.1% 40.3% 
Deferred profit sharing schemes 7.8% 8.5% 
Non-Executive Employee share ownership  7.9% 6.1% 
SAYE share options 30.0% 28.9% 
Discretionary of executive share ownership 
schemes 
20.8% 25.5% 
  
 
Source: WERS98, WERS Panel 1990-98 
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Exhibit 3a:  Compensation Strategies for All Employees  in Firm-Based Data Set 
 
Compensation Strategy Percentage of firms in year 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Approved profit-sharing scheme 18.9% 19.0% 22.0% 25.1% 
Other share-based profit-sharing scheme 4.3% 5.9% 8.8% 10.4% 
Cash-based profit-sharing scheme 13.6% 14.5% 15.9% 17.1% 
Approved profit-related-pay scheme 27.6% 34.7% 38.1% 36.9% 
Gain-sharing scheme: (company-wide bonus scheme related to 
improvements in productivity) 
3.2% 3.5% 4.4% 4.7% 
Approved SAYE share-option scheme 31.1% 35.6% 43.7% 45.8% 
Other all-employee share-option scheme 6.1% 9.3% 11.5% 12.4% 
Approved Company Share-Option Plan 41.2% 45.8% 54.6% 56.6% 
Other discretionary share-option scheme 22.9% 31.1% 40.7% 42.8% 
 
Exhibit 3b:  Compensation Strategies by Management/Non-Management Employees 
 
Compensation Strategy Management Non-Management 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Approved profit-sharing scheme 77.0% 79.5% 73.8% 78.5% 62.8% 65.1% 62.7% 65.1% 
Other share-based profit-sharing scheme 40.6% 44.6% 51.5% 43.2% 17.0% 11.3% 21.8% 17.7% 
Cash based profit-sharing scheme 72.1% 69.0% 69.9% 65.2% 49.5% 49.7% 47.4% 45.5% 
Approved profit-related-pay scheme 87.1% 89.0% 90.2% 87.3% 85.7% 86.9% 88.1% 86.5% 
Gain-sharing scheme 80.0% 82.5% 76.8% 78.8% 61.4% 53.8% 53.4% 58.1% 
Approved SAYE share-option scheme 63.3% 63.6% 61.3% 61.5% 47.6% 49.6% 47.4% 49.4% 
Other all-employee share-option scheme 62.8% 71.9% 65.2% 68.3% 59.7% 48.1% 50.4% 50.8% 
Approved company share-option scheme 52.0% 54.8% 56.0% 56.3% 13.2% 16.5% 18.7% 18.6% 
Other discretionary share-option scheme 39.2% 38.0% 40.9% 44.2% 10.6% 9.9% 11.5% 10.8% 
Notes: 
1. Based on a sample of 299 UK stock market firms surveyed in 1999.  Actual numbers of firms per 
cell may differ. 
2. The results in Table 1B are conditional upon the firm having the particular compensation strategy. 
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Exhibit 4:  Firm Level Productivity Regressions (fixed effects); the Impact of Shared Modes 
of Compensation in UK Listed Firms 1995-1998 
 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
Log (employment) 0.6990**  
(0.0885) 
0.6997**  
(0.0867) 
0.7018**  
(0.0888) 
0.7018**  
(0.0866) 
0.6990**  
(0.0855) 
Log (capital) 0.1707** 
(0.0400) 
0.1690** 
(0.0398) 
0.1690** 
(0.0397) 
0.1833** 
(0.0471) 
0.1870** 
(0.0479) 
Union -0.0444 
(0.0502) 
-0.0318 
(0.0460) 
-0.0279 
(0.0456) 
-0.0282 
(0.0441) 
-0.0593 
(0.0529) 
Competition -0.1244  
(0.1818) 
-0.1667  
(0.1670) 
-0.1624  
(0.1680) 
-0.0061 
(0.1103) 
0.0337 
(0.1305) 
Approved profit sharing 
scheme 
 
0.1739** 
(0.0704) 
- - - 0.1733** 
(0.0728) 
Approved profit related pay 
scheme 
 
 0.0369 
(0.0605) 
- - 0.0446 
(0.0625) 
Approved all employee 
share option scheme SAYE 
 
  -0.0142 
(0.0396) 
- -0.0292 
(0.0409) 
Approved company share 
option scheme 
   0.1314** 
(0.0578) 
0.1213** 
(0.0594) 
      
Observations 
Firms 
Year dummies 
Time period 
Adjusted R2 
942 
284 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9826 
938 
283 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9824 
942 
284 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9824 
936 
283 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9824 
932 
282 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9825 
 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is log of total output. 
2. § <p0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01.  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
3. All regressions contain an unreported arbitrary constant. 
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Exhibit 4 (cont.):  Firm Level Productivity Regressions (fixed effects); Management and Non-
Management Participation in Shared Compensation Schemes 
 
 (6) (7) 
 Employees: 
Managerial 
employees 
 
Employees: Non-
Managerial 
employees 
Log (employment) 0.7015**  
(0.0886) 
0.7039**  
(0.0905) 
Log (capital) 0.1891** 
(0.0491) 
0.1937** 
(0.0488) 
Union -0.0333 
(0.0517) 
-0.0404 
(0.0564) 
Competition -0.0306  
(0.1241) 
0.0310 
(0.0970) 
Approved profit sharing scheme (% employees 
participating) 
 
0.1128** 
(0.0625) 
0.1975** 
(0.0693) 
Approved profit related pay scheme (% employees 
participating)  
 
-0.0464 
(0.0382) 
-0.0643* 
(0.0364) 
Approved all employee share option scheme SAYE 
(% employees participating) 
 
-0.0066 
(0.0701) 
-0.0159 
(0.0833) 
Approved company share option scheme (% 
employees participating) 
0.1065 
(0.0913) 
-0.0356 
(0.0931) 
   
Observations 
Firms 
Year dummies 
Time period 
Adjusted R2 
932 
282 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9823 
932 
282 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9823 
 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is log of total output. 
2. § <p0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01.  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
3. All regressions contain an unreported arbitrary constant. 
4. Column 1 the employees participating in any shared compensation scheme are managerial employees.  
In column 2 it is non-managerial employees. 
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Exhibit 5:  Firm Level Stock Returns (OLS Estimates) and Shared Compensation Systems. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Firms’ annual stock 
returns 
 
Firms’ annual stock 
returns 
   
Approved profit sharing scheme (% employees 
participating) 
 
0.0910** 
(0.0314) 
0.0935** 
(0.0308) 
Approved profit related pay scheme (% employees 
participating)  
 
0.0223 
(0.0293) 
0.0157 
(0.0287) 
Approved all employee share option scheme SAYE 
(% employees participating) 
 
0.0749** 
(0.0299) 
0.0815** 
(0.0292) 
Approved company share option scheme (% 
employees participating) 
0.0204 
(0.0312) 
0.0308 
(0.0301) 
   
Return on FT All Share index 1.12** 
(0.434) 
- 
   
Observations 
Industry effects 
Year dummies 
Time period 
R2 
913 
Yes 
No 
1995-98 
0.043 
913 
Yes 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.103 
 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is firm shareholder return (defined as the annual change in the Datastream return 
index for each company) 
2. § <p0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01.  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. 
3. All regressions estimated by OLS 
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Exhibit 6:  The Relationship between Shared Compensation, Communication and 
Consultation:  Firm Level Estimates 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 
Joint Consultation 
Committees 
Information 
sharing 
Communication 
structure 
Any 
consultation/comm
unication 
 B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error 
         
Approved Profit Sharing (YN) 0.096* 0.034 0.043 0.043 0.152* 0.046 0.186* 0.044 
Approved Profit Related Pay (YN) -0.004 0.026 -0.044 0.037 0.103* 0.038 0.112* 0.038 
Approved SAYE (YN) 0.072* 0.026 0.102* 0.037 0.107* 0.039 0.138* 0.038 
Approved Company Share Option Plan (YN) -0.082* 0.024 -0.035 0.034 -0.011 0.037 -0.046 0.036 
         
Team based pay  (YN) 0.081 0.041 0.121 0.050 0.275 0.049 0.239 0.046 
Individual performance related pay (YN) 0.016 0.024 0.162 0.034 0.117 0.037 0.151 0.037 
Log (real sales) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Log (total employees) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Union recognised in workplace (Y/N) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Industry – 1 digit SE dummies (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Year dummies (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  
         
 ü  ü  ü  ü  
Constant ü  ü  ü  ü  
Number of Observsations 928  965  965  969  
Pseudo R-Squared 0.247  0.175  0.201  0.241  
         
 
 
Source: Own survey, marginal effects reported, robust standard errors (SE) presented. 
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Exhibit 7a:  Ordered Probit Estimates of the Link between Shared Compensation and Financial Pe rformance and Labour 
Productivity (Source:  WERS 1998 Cross-section) 
 
 Financial Performance (5 point scale)  Labour Productivity (5 point scale) 
 Presence (YN) Coverage (%)  Presence (YN) Coverage (%) 
 Separate  Summary Separate  Summary   Separate  Summary Separate  Summary 
 B SE B SE B SE B SE  B SE B SE B SE B SE 
              
Profit-related pay (YN) 0.18 0.06 - - 0.19 0.07 - -  0.14 0.07 - - 0.18 0.07 - - 
Deferred profit sharing  (YN)  0.08 0.10 - - 0.10 0.10 - -  0.01 0.10 - - 0.04 0.10 - - 
Employee Share Ownership (YN) 0.21 0.07 - - 0.23 0.08 - -  0.25 0.07 - - 0.23 0.08 - - 
Any Group performance related pay (YN) 0.11 0.07 - - 0.08 0.10 - -  0.04 0.08 - - 0.12 0.10 - - 
                  
Number of Group Variable Pay Schemes - - 0.14 0.03 - - - -  - - 0.12 0.03 - - - - 
Sum % Eligible for Group Variable Pay - - - - - - 0.19 0.04 - - - - - - 0.19 0.04 
                  
Individual performance related pay only  (YN) 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.07 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.31 0.20 0.32 0.20 
Union recognised in workplace (Y/N) -0.13 0.06 -0.12 0.06 -0.14 0.06 -0.13 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 0.06 -0.05 0.06 
                  
Age of Establishment (Years) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Number of Employees (N) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Women in the workplace (%) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Skilled- 3 levels  (%)  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Industry - 11 levels (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Competition- 5 levels (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
                  
Cut 1 -2.35 0.16 -2.35 0.16 -2.36 0.16 -2.35 0.16 -2.26 0.16 -2.27 0.16 -2.27 0.16 -2.27 0.16 
Cut 2 -1.37 0.13 -1.38 0.13 -1.39 0.13 -1.38 0.13 -1.34 0.13 -1.34 0.13 -1.34 0.13 -1.34 0.13 
Cut 3 -0.07 0.12 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 0.12 -0.09 0.12 0.26 0.13 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.13 
Cut 4 1.13 0.12 1.11 0.12 1.10 0.12 1.11 0.12 1.52 0.13 1.50 0.13 1.52 0.13 1.52 0.13 
                  
Number of Observations 1772 1773 1767 1767 1691  1692  1685  1685  
Pseduo R-Squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.014  
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Exhibit 7b:  Ordered Probit Estimates of the Link between Shared Compensation and Quality of Product and Services and 
Changes in Labour Productivity (Source: WERS 1998 Cross-Section) 
 
 Quality of Product and Services (5 point scale)  Changes in Labour Productivity (5 point scale) 
 Presence (YN) Coverage (%)  Presence (YN) Coverage (%) 
 Separate  Summary Separate  Summary   Separate  Summary Separate  Summary 
 B B SE B SE B SE B  SE SE B SE B SE B SE 
              
Profit-related pay (YN) 0.08 0.06 - - 0.17 0.07 - -  0.19 0.07 - - 0.25 0.08 - - 
Deferred profit sharing  (YN)  -0.04 0.10 - - -0.03 0.10 - -  -0.08 0.11 - - -0.06 0.11 - - 
Employee Share Ownership (YN) 0.07 0.07 - - 0.02 0.08 - -  0.14 0.08 - - 0.13 0.08 - - 
Any Group performance related pay (YN) 0.06 0.07 - - 0.10 0.10 - -  0.30 0.08 - - 0.35 0.10 - - 
                  
Number of Group Variable Pay Schemes - - 0.04 0.03 - - - -  - - 0.14 0.03 - - - - 
Sum % Eligible for Group Variable Pay - - - - - - 0.10 0.04 - - - - - - 0.22 0.04 
                  
Individual performance related pay only  (YN) -0.19 0.11 -0.19 0.11 -0.13 0.17 -0.12 0.17 0.29 0.12 0.24 0.12 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.19 
Union recognised in workplace (Y/N) -0.26 0.06 -0.26 0.06 -0.26 0.06 -0.27 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.22 0.06 0.20 0.06 
                  
Age of Establishment (Years) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Number of Employees (N) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Women in the workplace (%) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Skilled- 3 levels  (%)  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Industry - 11 levels (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Competition- 5 levels (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  ü  
                  
Cut 1 -3.14 0.24 -3.16 0.24 -3.13 0.24 -3.14 0.24 -2.11 0.16 -2.12 0.15 -2.12 0.16 -2.12 0.15 
Cut 2 -2.02 0.13 -2.03 0.13 -2.00 0.13 -2.01 0.13 -1.33 0.13 -1.35 0.13 -1.34 0.13 -1.35 0.13 
Cut 3 -0.60 0.12 -0.61 0.12 -0.59 0.12 -0.60 0.12 -0.49 0.12 -0.51 0.12 -0.51 0.12 -0.51 0.12 
Cut 4 0.83 0.12 0.82 0.12 0.85 0.12 0.83 0.12 0.59 0.12 0.57 0.12 0.58 0.12 0.57 0.12 
                  
Number of Observations 1878 1879 1872 1872 1830  1831  1823  1823  
Pseduo R-Squared 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  
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Exhibit 8:  Regression Estimates of the Relatinship between Shared Compensation for Non-
Managerial Employees and Communication and Consultation 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables  
 
 Briefings 
Joint Consultation 
Committees Quality Circles  High Level JCC 
 B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error B 
Std. 
Error 
         
Profit-related pay (YN) 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.03 
Deferred profit sharing (YN) 0.06 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.04 
Employee Share Ownership (YN) 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.03 
Any Group performance related pay (YN) 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.03 
         
Individual performance related pay only (YN) 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
Union recongised in workplace (Y/N) 0.09 0.02 0.19 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.27 0.02 
Age of Establisment (Years) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Number of Employees (N) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Women in the workplace (%) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Skilled- 3 levels  (%)  ü  ü  ü  ü  
Industry - 11 levels (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  
Competition- 5 levels (YN) ü  ü  ü  ü  
         
         
Constant 0.72 0.03 0.28 0.05 0.26 0.05 0.19 0.05 
Number of Observsations 2075  2075  2074  2031  
R-Squared 0.08  0.15  0.09  0.18  
Adjusted R-Squared 0.06  0.14  0.79  0.17  
Std Error of the Estimate 0.30  0.46  0.48  0.46  
         
 
 
Source: WERS 1998 
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Exhibit 9:  Change in the Proportion of Variable Pay for Non-Managerial Workers by 
Changes in Work Place Activities Over a Five-Year Period (1993-1998). 
 
 
i. Change in information provided by employers by change in proportion of
variable pay for non-managerial workers
% within Change: proportion of variable pay for non-managerial employees
67.8% 24.6% 6.2% 1.4% 100.0%
53.1% 30.7% 16.0% .2% 100.0%
41.3% 37.6% 19.9% 1.3% 100.0%
36.7% 38.8% 22.4% 2.0% 100.0%
47.0% 34.5% 17.5% 1.0% 100.0%
up a lot
up a little
no change
gone down
Change: proportion
of variable pay for
non-managerial
employees
Total
up a lot up a little no change gone down
Change: information provided to employees
Total
 
ii. Change in employees influence over job by employers by change in proportion
of variable pay for non-managerial workers
% within Change: proportion of variable pay for non-managerial employees
31.3% 50.2% 17.1% 1.4% 100.0%
21.3% 48.8% 28.1% 1.7% 100.0%
12.6% 44.2% 38.4% 4.8% 100.0%
18.4% 36.7% 36.7% 8.2% 100.0%
16.9% 45.8% 33.5% 3.8% 100.0%
up a lot
up a little
no change
gone down
Change: proportion
of variable pay for
non-managerial
employees
Total
up a lot up a little no change gone down
Change: employees influence over job
Total
 
iii. Change in how hard people work by employers by change in proportion of
variable pay for non-managerial workers
% within Change: proportion of variable pay for non-managerial employees
55.0% 33.2% 10.9% .9% 100.0%
43.7% 42.4% 12.2% 1.7% 100.0%
39.8% 37.3% 21.3% 1.6% 100.0%
39.6% 29.2% 22.9% 8.3% 100.0%
42.4% 37.9% 18.0% 1.7% 100.0%
up a lot
up a little
no change
gone down
Change: proportion
of variable pay for
non-managerial
employees
Total
up a lot up a little no change gone down
Change: how hard people work
Total
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iv. Change in employee influence over managerial decision-making by employers
by change in proportion of variable pay for non-managerial workers
% within Change: proportion of variable pay for non-managerial employees
20.9% 48.3% 28.9% 1.9% 100.0%
10.2% 49.7% 37.7% 2.3% 100.0%
7.6% 39.6% 50.5% 2.3% 100.0%
8.0% 24.0% 52.0% 16.0% 100.0%
9.7% 42.6% 45.0% 2.6% 100.0%
up a lot
up a little
no change
gone down
Change: proportion
of variable pay for
non-managerial
employees
Total
up a lot up a little no change gone down
Change: employee influence over managerial
decision-making
Total
 
v. Change in labour productivty by employers by change in proportion of variable
pay for non-managerial workers
% within Change: proportion of variable pay for non-managerial employees
62.1% 28.2% 5.8% 3.9% 100.0%
47.1% 39.1% 9.7% 4.1% 100.0%
40.4% 38.4% 17.1% 4.2% 100.0%
37.5% 31.3% 18.8% 12.5% 100.0%
44.4% 37.2% 14.0% 4.3% 100.0%
up a lot
up a little
no change
gone down
Change: proportion
of variable pay for
non-managerial
employees
Total
up a lot up a little no change gone down
Change: labour productivty
Total
 
 
 
Source: WERS 1998 
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Exhibit 10:  Number of Establishments with Varying Levels of Financial Performance and Labour 
Productivity in 1990 and 1997, by Change in Shared Compensation Systems, 1990-1997 
 
Profit Sharing   Non-Exec Share Ownership 
Financial Performance  Added       Removed  Added     Removed 
Relative to Average            1990      1997      1990    1997             1990  1997      1990    1997 
A lot Below  4  2     2 0   0 0   2 1 
Below    7  4     1        1   0 3   3 3 
Average   35 26     7 12  17 15   9 11 
Above Average  16 32     9  6  14 9   8 9 
A lot Above  24 22     4  4   9 13   8 6 
Total   86 86   23      23  40 40 30 30 
 
Average Score  .57 .79 .52 .57  .80 .80 .57 .53 
Change,1997-1990        .22      .05           .00       .04 
 
Diff in Difference      .17                       -.04 
 
Labour Productivity 
Relative to Average           1990      1997      1990    1997             1990  1997      1990    1997 
A lot Below  1  3 0 0     0 0   1 2 
Below    12 11 0 0     2 3   2 4 
Average  36 33 8 15   22       19  18 11 
Above Average  33 33 16 6   13 12            9 13 
A lot Above  12 14 5 8    5 8             5  5 
Total    94 94 29 29  42        42           35 35 
 
Average Score  .46 .47 .90 .76  .50 .60 .43 .43 
1997-1990         .01  -.14       .10       .00  
 
Diff in Difference                    .15     .10  
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated from 1990-1998 WERS panel, with average scores based on assigning 0 to average 
1 to above average, 2 to a lot above average; -1 to below average; -2 to a lot below average  
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Appendix A:  Descriptive Statistics on the Firm Level Data 
 
Variable  Year 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Log (real output) 10.84 10.66 10.65 10.75 
Log (employment) 6.04 5.90 5.86 5.96 
Log (capital) 10.47 10.29 10.31 10.41 
Trade unions/staff associations recognised by management for 
negotiating pay and conditions 24.3% 23.5% 23.4% 23.4% 
Competition (greater than 5 product market competitors) 71.9% 73.6% 75.6% 76.9% 
Information sharing (which is an indicator variable if the firm has any 
one of the following three practices) 43.1% 48.4% 56.5% 61.2% 
a) A joint committee of managers and employees primarily 
concerned with consultation rather than negotiation 13.6% 15.2% 18.0% 18.7% 
b) A formal structure for information sharing with 
employees (e.g. provision of data on financial status, 
production and labour market position, market strategy) 
27.6% 32.9% 37.6% 41.5% 
c) A formal structure for communication  between all levels of 
employees and management (e.g. quality circles, newsletters 
and suggestion schemes) 
39.6% 43.3% 48.8% 53.2% 
 
Notes: 
1. Based on a sample of 299 UK stock market firms surveyed in 1999.  Actual numbers of firms per cell 
may differ. 
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Appendix B:  Firm Level Productivity Regressions (Fixed Effects); The Impact of 
Shared Compensation Systems in UK Listed Firms 1995-1998.  Interaction 
Effects Between Information Sharing Included. 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
Log (employment) 0.6990**  
(0.0886) 
0.6995**  
(0.0851) 
0.7030**  
(0.0890) 
0.7028**  
(0.0855) 
0.7016**  
(0.0834) 
Log (capital) 0.1679** 
(0.0405) 
0.1625** 
(0.0392) 
0.1691** 
(0.0402) 
0.1785** 
(0.0462) 
0.1783** 
(0.0484) 
Union -0.0520  
(0.0509) 
-0.0081  
(0.0405) 
-0.0244 
(0.0451) 
-0.0346 
(0.0454) 
-0.0378 
(0.0503) 
Competition -0.1264  
(0.1784) 
-0.1688  
(0.1649) 
-0.1612  
(0.1661) 
-0.0059  
(0.1077) 
0.0384  
(0.1277) 
Information sharing 
 
-0.0288 
(0.0785) 
-0.0036 
(0.0742) 
-0.0481 
(0.0809) 
0.0046 
(0.0544) 
0.0034 
(0.0826) 
Approved profit sharing 
scheme 
0.2459** 
(0.0968) 
- - - 0.2206** 
(0.1048) 
Approved profit sharing 
scheme ´ info. Sharing 
 
-0.0936 
(0.0988) 
- - - -0.0540 
(0.1050) 
Approved profit related pay 
scheme 
 
 0.1646 
(0.1370) 
- - 0.1320 
(0.1377) 
Approved profit related pay 
scheme ´ info. Sharing 
 
 -0.1828  
(0.1258) 
- - -0.1221 
(0.1279) 
Approved all employee share 
option scheme SAYE  
 
  -0.0344 
(0.0759) 
- -0.0764 
(0.0889) 
Approved all employee share 
option scheme SAYE ´ info. 
Sharing 
 
  0.0335 
(0.0805) 
- 0.0765 
(0.0940) 
Approved company share 
option scheme 
 
   0.2278** 
(0.1140) 
0.2182** 
(0.1188) 
Approved company share 
option scheme ´ info. Sharing 
   -0.1512 
(0.1143) 
-0.1495 
(0.1214) 
Observations 
Firms 
Years 
Time period 
Overall R2 
942 
284 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9826 
938 
283 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9825 
942 
284 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.2929 
936 
283 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9825 
936 
283 
Yes 
1995-98 
0.9826 
Notes: 
1. Dependent variable is log of total output. 
2. § <p0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01.  Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
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